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Abstract
When the government cannot commit to withdraw from providing charity
health care, as is the case when it faces the Samaritan’s Dilemma, a pub-
lic health insurance scheme can be Pareto improving. However, the large
heterogeneity in the design of such schemes observed around the world begs
the question of what characterizes the optimal public health insurance plan.
In this paper, we examine the distortions created by three plans, nested
in terms of the constraints they place on the individual’s decision problem.
We find that linking public health insurance benefits to the use of a certain
type of health care, such as treatment in public hospitals, creates incentives
against the efficient use of higher quality health care. When such constraint
is lifted, but the public insurance scheme still determines a minimum level
of coverage for each illness, first best efficiency is achieved. It turns out
that placing constraints in the form of minimum levels of coverage for each
illness is necessary for efficiency. Removing such constraint decreases the
relative price of high quality care for a subset of illnesses, and leads to too
much high quality care used in equilibrium. This analysis suggests that the
widespread practice of determining illness by illness coverage in public health
insurance systems has an efficiency rationale, despite the administrative and
informational difficulties that it entails.
Keywords: Samaritan’s Dilemma, Health insurance.
JEL Classification Codes: H21, I18.
1 Introduction
A survey of health insurance markets across the world suggests two important
regularities: first, the near universal coexistence of public health insurance
with some form of private insurance. Second, the role -explicit or not- taken
by the government as health care provider of last resort, which implies the
free provision of some measure of health care to the poor and uninsured. Even
in the US, where public insurance is targeted to the elderly trough Medicare,
and the poor trough Medicaid, the government provides large subsidies for
hospitals to cover what has been termed uncompensated care , the recipients
of such care being mostly uninsured individuals (Hadley and Holahan [2003]).
These two observations can be readily reconciled as twin expressions of
what has been termed the Samaritan’s Dilemma by Buchanan [1975]: al-
truistic motives makes the government unable to commit not to provide
charity care to uninsured individuals who fall ill, such inability resulting in
an efficiency loss through underinsurance. When the government faces the
Samaritan’s Dilemma, a form of public health insurance is warranted.
A second look at the same cross section of markets however reveals a
puzzling fact: there is a large heterogeneity in the design of public health in-
surance schemes. In particular, there are large differences in the restrictions
placed on the public health insurance plan. At one end of the spectrum,
Chile’s public health insurance scheme is limited to mandating a minimum
level of expenditure in health insurance for working individuals, with com-
plete choice over the health plan: which illnesses are covered, etc 1. While
leaving such freedom of choice to consumers is an intriguing possibility from
an academic point of view, most health insurance schemes do place restric-
tions on the characteristics of the health plan. In some countries, public
health insurance defines minimum levels of coverage for different illnesses,
but allows individuals to purchase supplementary coverage from private in-
surers. This is the case in the US Medicare system, where individuals can top
up their insurance coverage through the privately provided Medigap health
plans. Private insurance has the same supplementary role in the French
health insurance system. Besides determining illness by illness coverage, as
in France and the US, in many countries the insurance scheme does not al-
low private insurance to supplement public coverage, forcing individuals to
1Some restrictions in the form of minimum coverage for a few illnesses have been
introduced since 2004
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opt out of the coverage given by public insurance if they choose a higher
quality of care. Such is the case in the Australian Medicare system, where
private hospital services are covered only by private insurance. This is also
the predominant arrangement in Spain, Ireland, and the UK (see Colombo
and Tapay [2004] for a description of health insurance markets in OECD
countries).
While the presence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma suggests that public
health insurance is efficiency enhancing, the questions of the efficiency prop-
erties of these different arrangements, and of the nature of the optimal public
health insurance scheme, remain open. These questions provide the main mo-
tivation for our paper. In a seminal contribution, Buchanan [1975] describes
the Samaritan’s Dilemma problem: when an altruist will transfer resources
to an individual conditional on experiencing bad luck, this individual will
have reduced incentives to avoid the bad luck, or insure against it. Two con-
tributions clarify the efficiency role of public provision in this context. Bruce
and Waldman [1991] show that the government can overcome its inability to
commit, and is able to achieve the first best allocation, by using transfers in
kind rather than in cash. Coate [1995] extends the argument to a situation
where the government can commit, but wealthy individuals care about the
fate of the poor. A straightforward extension of these results to health insur-
ance suggests that some type of public health insurance is Pareto enhancing,
but we are aware of no theoretical contribution that studies the distortions
created by different public health insurance schemes in the presence of the
Samaritan’s Dilemma.
We provide an answer to this question using a simple model with wealth/income
heterogeneity and health shocks, where altruistic individuals obtain utility
from consumption, their own health, and other individuals’ health. The gov-
ernment levies taxes to finance a public health plan. We compare three such
plans, indexed by the constraints they place on the nature of public health
insurance, and describe their efficiency properties. The first plan, which we
label Pure Public Insurance (PPI), defines levels of coverage for each illness,
and ties public insurance benefits to the use of low quality health care, mim-
icking the scheme in place in a number of developing countries. The second
plan, labelled Public Insurance with Plan Choice (PIPC), removes the link
between public insurance benefits and health care demand, by allowing for
the purchase of extra insurance. The third scheme we consider, Mandated
Insurance (MI), limits the public health plan to imposing a minimum amount
of expenditure in health insurance, leaving the choice of the levels of coverage
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for each illness to the individual.
Adverse selection is often put forward as an alternative argument to ex-
plain the near universality of public health insurance schemes. In our model,
public health insurance can be Pareto enhancing without resorting to un-
observed differences in risk, so in the name of simplicity we avoid introduc-
ing such heterogeneity, leaving the the question of the interaction between
Samaritan’s Dilemma and adverse selection motivated behavior for future
work.
Our results can be summarized as follows. A PPI scheme increases the
relative price of high versus low quality health care, resulting in underutiliza-
tion of quality relative to the first best. At the other end of the spectrum,
a MI scheme reduces the relative price of high versus low health care qual-
ity from the first best benchmark, resulting in too much quality used in
equilibrium. A PIPC scheme, where the government sets minimum levels of
coverage for each illness, while allowing for the purchase of extra coverage,
creates no relative price distortions, and hence achieves the first best. An im-
portant lesson from the analysis is that imposing minimum levels of coverage
for each illness is necessary for optimality of a public health insurance plan.
We provide in this sense an efficiency rationale for the widespread existence
of such constraints, despite the large administrative costs and information
requirements that they imply.
The paper has three other sections. Section two presents the model and
the alternative health insurance schemes, and describes the equilibrium con-
cept. Section three describes the planner’s problem, derives the equilibria
and describes the distortions created by each arrangement. Section four con-
cludes.
2 A model of health risks and health insur-
ance
We present a one period model with agents who are heterogeneous in wealth
endowments and face a risk to their health. Individuals derive utility from
their own consumption and health, and other individuals’ health, and may
use health care to moderate the utility loss from negative health shocks.
Besides being in good health, agents are faced with two stochastic health
states, and must choose at the beginning of the period a level of health
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insurance for each state. A treatment for health state i is labelled Li. Each
health state may be go untreated, or may be treated using one of two available
health care technologies: Li ∈ {0, Highi, Lowi}, differentiated by their cost
C(Li) and the level of utility they bring through better health. In this sense
Li may be thought of as representing the quality of health care. Individual
choices therefore have two dimensions: for each stochastic state, agents must
decide how much insurance to buy, and what health care technology to use.
This is a model with full information. While informational asymmetries
play a central role in the study of the different forms of market incomplete-
ness in health insurance markets, in our problem the distortions are created
from the government providing a minimum level of free health care to the
uninsured.
Health risks and health care technology. We let si denote health state
i with s = {s1, s2, s3} being the set of health states. The state s1 repre-
sents good health, and s2 and s3 two different illnesses. We assume that
both illnesses have the same associated probabilities (p2 = p3) and costs
(C(L2) = C(L3)): this benchmark aims to make clear that our arguments
are not dependent on extreme assumptions about s2 and s3. The probabil-
ities associated to these health states are {p1, p2, p3}, and when there is no
scope for ambiguity we use the index i to refer to states s2 or s3. Health care
is produced at a cost of C(Highi) = li if the High technology is used, and
C(Lowi) = θli if the Low technology is used, with θ < 1 and i = 2, 3. Using
two technologies allow us to capture both that health care is a normal good,
and that government provided free health care is usually of inferior quality
to that obtained through private insurance, this quality difference reflecting
purely technical differences in the treatments 2.
The market for insurance. There is free entry in the market for health
insurance and therefore firms earn zero profits. We label hg the level of
government provided insurance and hp the level of private insurance, and use
the same superscripts for the contingent payments qi. We assume that the
government purchases insurance cover at market rates. Since there are no
costs of selling insurance, premia are actuarially fair. This implies
hp = p2q
p
2 + p3q
p
3 (1)
hg = p2q
g
2 + p3q
g
3 (2)
2As opposed to reflecting lack of choice, waiting times, etc, as this would cloud the
relationship between social cost and utility from the treatment.
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Note that both hg and hp may differ across wealth levels. For some levels
of hp, insurance companies will set qpi low enough so as to induce agents to
free ride the government health care financing system in the case of event i.
In such cases we take the convention that qpi = 0. Insurance companies can
observe the wealth of each agent, and will offer policies that depend on the
amount of insurance purchased hp, and therefore indirectly on wealth.
Endowments. Agents are endowed with a wealth levelW at the beginning
of the period, with wealth following the distribution G(W ) with support
[W,+∞) ≡ [θ(l2p2 + l3p3),+∞). The lower bound W ensures that everyone
can afford full insurance with at least Low quality health care, and therefore
allows for a clean comparison between the first best allocation, where the
government need not provide subsidies, and the equilibrium allocations. The
issue of what are the best health insurance policies for individuals below W
is somewhat uninteresting in this setup, as such policies would invariably
involve subsidies.
The government. The government taxes individuals an amount τ =
θ(p2l2+ p3l3), or 2θlipi. This amount is sufficient to provide public insurance
that covers Low quality health care for both illnesses, if such policy is chosen.
The government uses the tax to purchase health insurance (hg), and returns
the difference in cash (T1), so that
T1 = τ − hg (3)
Equation (3) implies no cross subsidization. Rather than focusing on the
question of optimal redistribution, we focus on the nature of the optimal
health insurance arrangements.
A government policy consists of three elements, besides the tax τ . The
first is an explicit insurance plan, given by constraints on {hg, qgi }, and fi-
nanced by the tax. The second element is an unconditional transfer T1, and
the third is a set of conditional transfers T i2 for states i ∈ {2, 3}. Both the
insurance plan and the transfers are functions of wealth.
The government budget constraint for individual j is then
τ = T1(Wj) + h
g(Wj) + T2(Wj)I[s2] + T3(Wj)I[s3] (4)
Where I[si] is an indicator function equal to one if the individual is in state si
and decides to request a conditional transfer. Note that, by 3 this constraint
is satisfied only if conditional transfers are equal to zero. In our model, the
demand for conditional transfers to finance Low quality health care reveals
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a failure of government policy to either provide explicit public insurance or
induce individuals to purchase private insurance.
Preferences. Individual j derives utility from consumption (uj1) and her
own health (uj2), as well as other individuals’ health (u
j′
2 ), and rank choices
according to expected utility
U j =
3∑
i=1
pi{uj1(ci) + uj2(si, Li)}+min
j′
{uj′2 (si, Li)} (5)
Where the third term indicates the utility from health for the worst off indi-
vidual -in terms of health and health care used- in the population. In what
follows we omit the superscripts to obtain a more concise notation. To un-
derstand the role played by this term, note that in order for a commitment
problem to arise, a measure of altruism is necessary. Here the altruism takes
the form of caring for the health of the least fortunate. This Rawlsian fea-
ture of preferences implies that the role of public health insurance will be to
provide a safety net against health shocks, ensuring a minimum standard of
care for everyone. We believe that this is indeed the role assigned to public
health insurance in most countries.
That the above function is separable in consumption and health simplifies
the analysis and is non essential to the points made by this paper. For u1, we
choose for simplicity a function that displays constant absolute risk aversion,
where r is the risk aversion parameter:
u1(ci) = −exp(−rci). (6)
The function u2 is assumed to be increasing in its second argument, and
bounded above by u2(s1). This assumption implies that being in good health
is preferable to being in bad health even if treated in a very good hospital.
We assign a large penalty to the situation where an agent goes without
health care treatment if sick. This penalty ensures that no one chooses,
absent government insurance, to forgo treatment if ill, and can be motivated
heuristically by the individual facing the possibility of death if going without
health care treatment. The assumption can be formalized as:
Assumption 1 Being in states s2 or s3 with L = 0 has an infinitely large
compensating variation with respect to being in the same state with Low
quality health care. For i ∈ {2, 3}:
u1(lim c→ +∞) + u2(i, 0) < u1(0) + u2(i, Low)
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Note that in the current framework the externality created by the ill indi-
viduals with the lowest level of health care treatment implies that, even if it
is privately optimal to forgo any treatment, the planner may still choose to
subsidize health care. We use the above assumption to rule out this possi-
bility, as it would divert us from the central question of the optimal health
insurance arrangements in the presence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
The budget constraint in health state i for an agent who paid hp in health
insurance and will receive a payment of qi in this contingency takes the form
ci = W − hg − hp − C(Li) + qi (7)
Where W represents wealth and hg = τ − T1 by condition (3) above. When
healthy, it is understood that {L1, C(L1)} = {0, 0}, which implies q1 = 0, so
consumption is just c1 = W − hg − hp.
Timing. Two sets of decisions are made by individuals. Before the un-
certainty is resolved, agents are endowed with a wealth level W , pay a tax τ
and receive a cash transfer T1. At this time the government announces the
rules of the public health system in place, given by constraints on {hg, qgi }.
Individuals then choose simultaneously a level of private health insurance hp,
as well as insurance payments qp2 and q
p
3. After the uncertainty is resolved,
agents choose a level of consumption c and make health care choices Li, pos-
sibly receiving a government transfer T i2 in the form of health care. This
timing of events is displayed in Figure 1.
Health insurance arrangements. We first consider an economy where the
government can commit, and use it as a benchmark. We compare three health
insurance arrangements to this benchmark, each of them placing successively
fewer constraints on the nature of the health insurance scheme:
1. Commitment (C).
In an economy with commitment, there is no need for transfers in the
form of health insurance, so the government sets T1 = τ . The household
chooses consumption, health insurance and health care to solve
max
hp,qpi ,ci,Li
p1(u1(c1) + u2(s1)) + p2(u1(c2) + u2(s2, L2)) (P1)
+p3(u1(c3) + u2(s3, L3))
s.t. ci = W − hp − C(Li) + qpi for i = 1, 2, 3
hp = p2q
p
2 + p3q
p
3
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Where we omit the min term in the objective function, as it does not
affect the household’s choices. A solution to this problem are policy
functions for consumption c : s × R+ → R+; for the level of insurance
hp : R+ → R+; for insurance payments qp : s×R+ → R+ and for health
care treatment L : s× R+ → {0, Low,High}.
2. Pure Public Insurance (PPI).
In this case the insurance arrangement determines a level of public
insurance (hg), with predetermined coverage (qg2 and q
g
3) for the different
health states. Moreover, individuals can only use the insurance plan
to purchase Low quality health care, so the plan gives no choice of
purchasing extra insurance to access higher quality health care. The
individual can however privately insure one or both ill states in order
to access High quality health care, but she will bear the full costs of
this insurance plan.
The household problem in an economy with PPI is given by:
max
hp,qi,q
p
i ,ci,Li,T
i
2
p1(u1(c1) + u2(s1)) + p2(u1(c2) + u2(s2, L2)) (8)
+p3(u1(c3) + u2(s3, L3)) (P2)
s.t. ci = W − hg − hp − C(Li) + qi + T i2 for i = 1, 2, 3 (9)
hp = p2q
p
2 + p3q
p
3 (10)
hg > 0 given (11)
qgi given (12)
qi =
{
qgi if Li = Low
qpi if Li = High
(13)
Expressions (8) to (10) are otherwise equivalent to problem (P1), but
the constraints (11) to (13) characterize the household problem un-
der PPI. The solution is given by policy functions for {hp, qi, qpi , ci, Li}
above plus a function T2 : s×R+ → R that maps a state and a level of
insurance coverage to a level of conditional transfers requested. Note
that the choice of Li is both a choice of health care quality and a choice
of whether to use privately provided health care (Li = High), or free
publicly provided health care (Li = Low). Constraint (11) sets the
minimum level of expenditure in health insurance to hg, while (13)
links public insurance to Low quality health care.
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This public insurance arrangement captures the nature of most insur-
ance systems in OECD countries. This arrangement is also common in
developing countries, where it takes the form of linking public insurance
to the use of public hospitals and health care centers.
3. Public insurance with plan choice (PIPC).
In this case the insurance arrangement determines a minimum level
of insurance given by hg, as well as the plan (qg2 and q
g
3) that will
be purchased with this insurance level. As opposed to the previous
arrangement, individuals can purchase extra insurance to access higher
quality health care. This plan gives individuals a minimum level of
coverage, but leaves them the choice of purchasing different levels of
health care quality without having to opt out of the public insurance
arrangement.
The household problem in this case is given by (P2), with conditions
(11) to (13) replaced by :
hg > 0 given (14)
qgi given (15)
qi = q
g
i + q
p
i (16)
Constraints (14) and (15) are also present in (P2). Constraint (16)
says that extra coverage can be purchased on top of public insurance
coverage.
As discussed in the introduction, this health insurance system cap-
tures the main features of the Medicare plan in the US, and the public
health insurance system in France. These features are also part of the
plan characteristics in the universal health insurance proposal by Mark
Pauly and coauthors in Pauly et al. [1991]:
All insurance plans must provide at least the minimum ben-
efits specified by the government...
A plan could offer benefits beyond the required minimum
[...] with an additional premium charge, for those consumers
preferring more extensive coverage.
4. Mandated insurance (MI).
With mandated insurance, the government sets a minimum level of
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insurance, but individuals are free to choose different plans (qi’s), as
well as to purchase extra coverage. Individuals are also free to choose
different levels of health care quality to be covered by the insurance
plan.
The household problem in this economy is given by (P2) with conditions
(11) to (13) replaced by a single constraint that requires the level of
insurance to be above a minimum:
hg > 0 given (17)
This arrangement is currently in place in Chile, and a number of Euro-
pean countries, by giving individuals a choice of plans, are advancing
in this direction (see Kerssens and Groenewegen [2005] for an account
of this trend).
In the light of this discussion, the three arrangements described above can
be seen as being nested in terms of the constraints they place on the public
health plan offered: note that PIPC and PPI are clearly nested in MI, as the
restrictions MI places on the public insurance scheme is a subset of those that
characterize the other two arrangements. Then, PPI is also nested in PIPC,
as individuals who can reach a health care bundle {L2, L3} with PPI can
also reach it with PIPC, but the inverse does not hold. Figure 2 illustrates
this observation: it shows the consumption possibilities for an individual who
chooses complete insurance given a bundle of health care qualities. From an
individual point of view, MI is always weakly preferred to PIPC, which in
turn is weakly preferred to PPI.
When studying the welfare implications of these three arrangements, we
are then interested in what set of constraints in the public health insurance
arrangement allow the government to minimize the distortions caused by the
its inability to commit.
The nature of the equilibrium is that of a standard competitive equilib-
rium, where we impose that the government cannot deny a minimum level of
health care to all those who require it, and at the same time runs a balanced
budget on an individual basis. The first requirement, which we take as given
here, will be formally motivated by efficiency arguments in the next section.
We define an equilibrium for the case of PPI, the extension to the remaining
arrangements being straightforward.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium for the economy with PPI is a set of transfer
functions {T1(W ), T 22 (W ), T 32 (W )}, a public health scheme {hg(W ), qgi (s,W )},
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insurance and health care optimal policies {hp(W ), L(s,W )}, an optimal
policy for consumption c(s,W ), as well as an insurance payment function
qp(s,W ), and a provider choice policy D(s,W ), which satisfies three condi-
tions:
1. Given {T1(W )} and {hg(W ), qgi (s,W )}, households choose
{hp(W ), L(s,W ), qp(s,W ), D(s,W ), T2(s,W )} to solve problem (P2).
2. Private health insurance premia are actuarially fair, which implies that
conditions 1 and 2 hold for all wealth levels:
hp(W ) = p1q
p(1,W ) + p2q
p(2,W )
hg(W ) = p1q
g(1,W ) + p2q
g(2,W )
3. The government budget is balanced with respect to each household,
which implies T2(s,W ) = 0:
τ = T1(W ) + h
g(W )
The government can be seen as playing a Stackelberg game with individuals.
After announcing the insurance plan and the unconditional transfer, indi-
viduals make decisions on consumption and the purchase of private health
insurance. After the uncertainty is revealed, individuals make decisions on
health care, possibly including requesting conditional transfers in the form
of health care if ill. The government then incorporates individual demand
functions into the design of the public policy, so that the public insurance
plan satisfies: (1) Both illnesses are covered by public or private insurance,
which covers at least Low quality health care, and (2) Public insurance is
not redundant to the individual. The first condition implies that conditional
transfers (T i2) are not used in equilibrium. The second condition is a conse-
quence of the no profit condition (2).
In this equilibrium definition, the government policy is constrained only
by the requirement of budget balance and the no profit condition 2, which
amounts to the transfers being an equilibrium of the Stackelberg game de-
scribed above. In the next section, we study the optimal policies for the three
health insurance arrangements, and compare the equilibrium allocations they
induce to the first best allocation
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3 Welfare implications of health insurance ar-
rangements
As discussed in the previous section, the planner does not have recourse to
transferring resources across individuals. This allows to focus on the question
of the optimal health insurance scheme. For concreteness, we may think of
the planner as maximizing a social welfare function that gives the same weight
to all individuals:
SW =
∫
UdG∫
(
3∑
i=1
pi{uj1(ci) + uj2(si, Li)})dG+min
j′
{u2(si, Li)} (18)
That individuals care about the worst off in terms of health care utilization
motivates the planner to ensure that no one goes without a minimum stan-
dard of treatment if sick. Note that since we do not allow for redistribution,
and the poorest agents can barely afford insurance that covers the Low qual-
ity treatment, the planner cannot achieve the goal that all individuals access
the High quality treatment. To summarize, in this framework the role of
altruism is reduced to giving the planner the constraint that everyone must
be guaranteed a minimum standard of health care -in our case Low quality
care- and the government’s inability to commit stems directly from it. A
number of public health insurance arrangements meet this constraint, each
of which induces different distortions. The role of the planner is then to
choose the arrangement that minimizes these distortions.
We begin by describing the general features of the equilibrium, which
are shared by all economies. Since utility is concave, and insurance premia
are actuarially fair, individuals will always choose complete insurance, be it
explicit through public or private insurance, or implicit through conditional
in kind transfers. This implies that no out of pocket expenditures are made
on health care in any state of nature. Health care is a normal good, so the
poorest individuals, up to a given wealth level, will choose to use a Low
quality of health care in both ill states of nature, while individuals from this
level to a second wealth level will choose insurance to cover High quality
health care in one state, which without loss of generality we take to be
state s2, and Low quality in the other state. Wealthier individuals choose
insurance to coverHigh quality health care in both ill states of nature. These
12
two margins can be characterized by the choice of {L2, L3}. We will label
them the low quality margin ({Low,Low} vs. {High, Low}), and the high
quality margin ({High, Low} vs. {High,High}).
Equilibrium with commitment. Given the discussion in the previous para-
graph, the equilibrium allocation is completely characterized by the health
care demands {L2, L3}. In the case where the government can commit not to
give conditional transfers, it is optimal to return the entire tax receipt as an
unconditional cash transfer, so T1 = τ . In this case the demands for health
care are
{L2, L3} =

{Low,Low} if W ∈ [W,W1)
{High, Low} if W ∈ [W1,W2)
{High,High} if W ∈ [W2,+∞)
(19)
With the indifference levels of wealth given by
W1 =
1
r
ln
exp(r(p2l2 + θp3l3))− exp(θr(l2p2 + l3p3))
p2(u2(2, High)− u2(2, Low)) (20)
W2 =
1
r
ln
exp(r(p2l2 + p3l3))− exp(r(l2p2 + θl3p3))
p3(u2(3, High)− u2(3, Low)) (21)
The derivation of this equilibrium is straightforward and left for appendix A.
Equilibrium under Pure Public Insurance. As discussed in the previous
section, in this arrangement individuals must opt out of public insurance
if they want to access High quality health care for a given illness. Lack of
commitment implies that, if they anticipate choosing a Low quality treatment
for a given state, they will have no incentive to purchase insurance against
it.
Considering that the planner aims to reproduce the allocation in the econ-
omy with commitment, it will offer different insurance packages to individuals
with different wealth levels. The problem faced by the planner in trying to
induce the first best allocation is that, since the price of Low quality care
is now zero, individuals at the margins will be induced to substitute High
quality for Low quality, given that the balanced budget rule in 4 prevents an
income effect.
The problem of inducing the allocation in (19) is that of inducing individ-
uals to be indifferent between the choices {Low,Low} and {Low,High} at
the wealth levelW1, and between the choices {Low,High} and {High,High}
at the wealth level W2.
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In order to induce individuals to switch health care demands from {Low,Low}
to {High, Low}, the government uses two sets of transfer and health insur-
ance policies aimed at individuals with different wealth levels. The first
policy is to set T1 = 0 and {hg, qg2 , qg3} = {2θlipi, θli, θli} for poorer indi-
viduals, so that public insurance covers health care at the Low quality for
both ill states. In equilibrium, an individual who receives such transfer will
demand Low quality in both states s2 and s3, or otherwise the no profit
condition (2) will be violated. The second policy is to set T1 = θl2 and
{hg, qg2 , qg3} = {θlipi, 0, θli} for individuals above a threshold, and aims to
induce the utilization of High quality health care for one of the states, which
we take to be state s2. If faced with this policy an individual rather demands
{L2, L3} = {High,High}, the no profit condition -condition 2 in the equilib-
rium definition- is violated; if {L2, L3} = {Low,Low}, the government will
run a budget deficit, violating condition 3 of the equilibrium definition.
The first transfer and public insurance policy induces behavior consistent
with the equilibrium for individuals with wealth lower than a cutoff level,
which we call W
PPI
1 , while the second transfer policy induces equilibrium
behavior for individuals with wealth higher than a second cutoff level, which
we call W PPI1 . While W
PPI
1 is smaller than W
PPI
1 , so that the policy switch
can be implemented over some wealth range, we have
W1 < W
PPI
1 < W
PPI
1 . (22)
This condition implies that the planner cannot achieve the first best alloca-
tion on this margin. The best it can do is to implement the first transfer
policy to individuals with wealth in [W,W PPI1 ), and the second transfer pol-
icy to individuals with wealth W PPI1 and higher, up to a second cutoff level
yet to be defined.
To induce individuals to switch health care demands from {High, Low}
to {High,High}, the planner faces a similar problem. In this case, a pol-
icy {T1, hg, qg2 , qg3} = {θli, θli, 0, θli} will induce individuals with wealth below
W
PPI
2 to demand {High, Low}, while a policy {T1, hg, qg2 , qg3} = {2θlipi, 0, 0, 0}
will induce individuals with wealth higher than a cutoff level W PPI2 to de-
mand {High,High}, with
W2 < W
PPI
2 < W
PPI
2 . (23)
Again, only second best optimality can be achieved at this margin, and it is
done by switching policies at the level W PPI2 , defined below. The optimal
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equilibrium public policies in this arrangement are
{T1, hg, qg2 , qg3} =

{0, 2θlipi, θli, θli} if W ∈ [W,W PPI1 )
{θlipi, θlipi, 0, θli} if W ∈ [W PPI1 ,W PPI2 )
{2θlipi, 0, 0, 0} if W ∈ [W PPI2 ,+∞)
(24)
This transfer and public health insurance policy induces the following policy
functions for health insurance and health care use:
{hp, qp2, qp3} =

{0, 0, 0} if W ∈ [W,W PPI1 )
{lipi, li, 0} if W ∈ [W PPI1 ,W PPI2 )
{2lipi, li, li} if W ∈ [W PPI2 ,+∞)
(25)
{L2, L3} =

{Low,Low} if W ∈ [W,W PPI1 )
{High, Low} if W ∈ [W PPI1 ,W PPI2 )
{High,High} if W ∈ [W PPI2 ,+∞)
(26)
With the cutoff points given by
W PPI1 =
1
r
ln
exp(θrlipi)(exp(rlipi)− 1)
p2(u2(2, θl2)− u2(2, l2)) (27)
W PPI2 =
1
r
ln
exp(rlipi)(exp(rlipi)− 1)
p3(u2(3, θl3)− u2(3, l3)) (28)
Table 1 compares the optimal PPI equilibrium to the equilibrium with com-
mitment. Note that it has the same structure as that under commitment,
but displays underinsurance at both the low and high quality margins. The
following proposition summarizes the welfare implications of implementing
an optimal PPI arrangement.
Proposition 1 An optimal Pure Public Insurance scheme is not first best ef-
ficient. Moreover, it results in underinsurance and underutilization of quality
at both margins.
Proof: Follows from inequalities (22) and (23)
Note that the failure of this arrangement to attain the first best allocation
is a direct consequence of individuals facing a distorted relative price of High
versus Low health care. Such distortion occurs precisely because with PPI
individuals have to opt out of the public insurance scheme in order to access
higher quality care, and therefore the price of High quality relative to Low
quality is higher than in the economy with commitment.
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Because the result in proposition 1 hinges entirely on the opting out fea-
ture of PPI, it is robust to the inclusion of more than two health care qualities.
At the limit, with an unbounded continuum of qualities, every individual up
to a threshold would choose to rely on public insurance for at least one illness,
and consume different levels of quality for the other. Wealthier individuals
would rely on private insurance for both illnesses, demanding levels of quality
in accord to their means. By the same token, extending the model to more
than two illnesses would deliver no further insights.
Equilibrium under Public Insurance with Plan Choice. Under PIPC indi-
viduals have a minimum level of coverage qgi = θli for each illness (i = 2, 3),
but may access higher quality health care by purchasing extra coverage. Un-
der this arrangement, once Low quality care is covered the marginal cost of
purchasing insurance to cover High quality health care is (1− θ)li for state
si, which is the same marginal cost faced by individuals in the economy with
commitment. Since PIPC does not distort relative prices, it is expected that
the equilibrium is first best efficient.
Proposition 2 An optimal Public Insurance with Plan Choice scheme at-
tains the first best allocation.
Proof: Omitting the min term in the utility function, the household prob-
lem can be stated as
max
hp,qi,q
p
i ,ci,Li,T
i
2
p1(u1(c1) + u2(s1)) + p2(u1(c2) + u2(s2, L2)) (P3)(29)
+p3(u1(c3) + u2(s3, L3))
s.t. ci = W − hg − hp − C(Li) + qi + T i2 for i = 1, 2, 3 (30)
hp = p2q
p
2 + p3q
p
3 (31)
hg > 0 given (32)
qi ≥ qgi , qgi given (33)
qi = q
g
i + q
p
i (34)
With the policy qgi = θli. Since in the first best allocation no individual
chooses qi < θli for i ∈ {2, 3}, the constraint (33) will not be binding.
Straightforward relabelling shows that the problem faced by individuals is the
same as in the economy with commitment.
Although this arrangement is first best efficient, in practice it requires from
the planner detailed knowledge of what constitutes a minimum standard of
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care for each single illness. In this sense it would desirable to obtain the
same efficiency result with an arrangement that places fewer restrictions on
the nature of the insurance scheme, such as the MI scheme.
Equilibrium under Mandated Insurance. Under MI individuals are con-
strained to a minimum level of aggregate insurance hg which they can use to
purchase a plan {qg2 , qg3} of their choice, subject to the no profit constraint
in (2). Individuals can also purchase insurance in excess of this minimum.
We assume that insurance plans cannot give cash handouts, so if hg covers
in excess of li for i ∈ {2, 3}, the remaining amount is destined to cover the
other ill state. Departing from the assumptions in the previous health insur-
ance arrangements, in this setting the planner can mandate an hg above that
which covers Low quality care for both ill states. As will become clear below,
no equilibrium exists if the planner is constrained to setting hg = 2θlipi.
3
The difficulty faced by the planner in setting the optimal levels of hg is
that individuals, knowing that they can access Low quality care for free, will
prefer to devote the entire amount of mandated insurance to cover High
quality care for one state, up to the cost of such treatment, and obtain
(partial) subsidies through T2 for the other, rather than insuring both ill
states equally.
At the high quality margin the planner faces no free riding problem when
inducing individuals to demand efficient levels of insurance and health care
quality. The planner can ensure efficiency at this margin by mandating
hg = 2lipi for individuals with wealth higher than W2, and h
g = (1 + θ)lipi
for individuals with wealth (marginally) lower than W2. This feature of the
solution is clearly driven by health care quality being a discreet choice. With
a continuum of qualities, individuals will always be tempted to demand too
much quality with respect to the first best, as is the case here at the low
quality margin.
At the margin between {Low,Low} and {High, Low}, the planner will
face the problem discussed above: while it can induce individuals in [W1,W2)
to purchase an efficient insurance plan that covers {High, Low}, in order to
induce those with wealth lower than W1 to demand {Low,Low} it is con-
strained to set hg = 2θlipi. If the planner mandates h
g < 2θlipi, individuals
will have no incentives to purchase extra insurance to cover {Low,Low} 4.
3Here we use the notation hg to denote the minimum mandated health insurance, and
hp to denote supplemental insurance.
4The planner could induce {Low,Low} health care utilization by setting hg = 0 and
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If it mandates hg > 2θlipi and individuals choose {Low,Low}, there will be
too much coverage of at least one state. In this case, where the government
mandates hg = 2θlipi, individuals will prefer to insure both ill states to cover
Low quality care only if this provides higher utility than ensuring one state
to cover High quality care:
u1(W − 2θlipi) + p2u2(s2, Low) + p3u2(s3, Low) ≥ (35)
u1(W −max{2θlipi, lipi}) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, Low)
If the cost difference between Low and High quality is small enough, so
that 2θ > 1, the mandated minimum insurance will be sufficient to purchase
coverage forHigh quality care in one state of nature, and everyone will choose
{q2, q3} = {li, 2θli− li} and {L2, L3} = {High, Low}. If this condition is not
met, individuals with wealth higher than a critical level WMI1 will choose to
purchase extra insurance above hg to cover High quality care for one of the
ill states, and leave the other state uninsured. The expression for WMI1 is
WMI1 =
1
r
ln
exp(rlipi)− exp(r2θlipi)
p2(u2(s2, High)− u2(s2, Low)) . (36)
With WMI1 < W1, so in neither case (θ >
1
2
or θ ≤ 1
2
) the planner can induce
individuals to insure efficiently at this margin. Summarizing, the optimal
public policy with MI are
hg =

2θlipi if W ∈ [W,WMI1 )
(1 + θ)lipi if W ∈ [WMI1 ,W2)
2lipi if W ∈ [W2,+∞)
(37)
This public policy induces the following policy functions for private insurance
and health care demand:
{hp, qg2 + qg2 , qg3 + qg3} =

{0, θli, θli} if W ∈ [W,WMI1 )
{0, li, θli} if W ∈ [WMI1 ,W2)
{0, li, li} if W ∈ [W2,+∞)
(38)
{L2, L3} =

{Low,Low} if W ∈ [W,WMI1 )
{High, Low} if W ∈ [WMI1 ,W2)
{High,High} if W ∈ [W2,+∞)
(39)
relying on conditional transfers, but a policy of conditional transfers is effectively a policy
where the government provides insurance, and we are interested in whether mandated
insurance alone can implement the first best and free the government from taking the role
of insurer of last resort
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Table 2 compares the MI equilibrium to the first best equilibrium. As with
PPI, MI is socially inefficient, but the distortions it creates are in the form
of too much insurance for some states, and with it the consumption of too
much health care quality, as opposed to the general result of underinsurance
in the PPI arrangement. This is formalized in the following proposition
Proposition 3 An optimal public insurance scheme with Mandated Insur-
ance is not first best efficient: it induces too much insurance and quality
utilization at the low quality margin.
Proof: The formal derivation of the equilibrium is left for appendix A. It
is sufficient to note that the equilibrium health care demands have the same
structure as in the economy with commitment, but with a lower cutoff point
at the low quality margin, as WMI1 < W1.
By allowing individuals to choose the mix of states to be insured, while
keeping the government’s role of provider of free Low quality health care,
MI provides incentives to individuals to purchase high levels of coverage for
selected states at no marginal cost, effectively reducing the relative price
of High versus Low health care quality for those states. Note that the
discreetness of both the number of illnesses and qualities of care does not
play any role in proposition 3. In this sense, the result in this proposition is
robust to extending the model on both these dimensions.
The phenomenon described here is widely observed in Chile, where pri-
vately insured individuals tend to switch to the public insurer, which has an
open door policy, in the presence of catastrophic, high deductible illnesses.
This switching behavior implies that such illnesses are de facto not covered
by private insurers, so the entire amount of mandated insurance is devoted
to cover the set of remaining illnesses.
4 Conclusions
In a model where individuals are altruistic towards other individuals’ health,
and therefore public health insurance is a Pareto improving institution, we
examined the distortions created by different constraints imposed on the
public health insurance scheme. Our findings suggest that constraints that
link public health insurance benefits to the use of a certain type of health
care, as is the case in a number of insurance schemes in developing countries,
creates incentives against the efficient use of higher quality health care. If
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such constraint is lifted, but the public insurance scheme still determines a
minimum level of coverage for each illness, first best efficiency is achieved. It
turns out that defining minimum levels of coverage for each illness is actually
necessary for efficiency, as removing such constraint leads, as in the case of
Mandated Insurance, to too much high quality care used in equilibrium. Our
analysis suggests then an efficiency rationale for the widespread determina-
tion of illness by illness coverage in public health insurance systems, despite
the administrative and informational difficulties that it entails.
The analysis presented here is a necessary first step towards understand-
ing the wide diversity of public health insurance arrangements observed
across countries. In this simple framework, a number of extensions have
been left for future work. An important question left for future work relates
to the design of efficient health insurance schemes when there is unobserved
cross sectional heterogeneity in health risks. We can only speculate that,
with unobserved heterogeneity in risks, mandated insurance may become an
appealing alternative, as it would allow different individuals to purchase dif-
ferent health plans. Such efficiency gains would then have to be weighted
against the efficiency losses discussed in this paper.
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A Derivation of equilibria
In this appendix we derive the equilibria in the economies with commitment,
PPI and MI.
A.1 Commitment
We first derive the standard result that qi = C(Li). The first order conditions
with respect to q2 and q3 are:
(q2) p1(−p2)u′1(c1) + p2(1− p2)u′1(c2) + p3(−p2)u′1(c3) = 0 (40)
(q3) p1(−p3)u′1(c1) + p2(−p3)u′1(c2) + p3(1− p3)u′1(c3) = 0 (41)
After some algebra we obtain u′1(c2) = u
′
1(c3), which implies c2 = c3. Using
this last expression in the FOC for (q2) to eliminate c2 yields c1 = c3, so con-
sumption is smoothed across states of nature. From the budget constraints
we then obtain
qi = C(Li) (42)
From the no profit conditions we have h = p2C(L2) + p3C(L3). Indirect
utility can then be expressed as a function of Li and W :
v(L2, L3;W ) = u1(W−p2C(L2)−p3C(L3))+p1u2(s1)+p2u2(s2, L2)+p3u2(s3, L3)
(43)
At the low quality margin, the household chooses between {L2, L3} =
{Low,Low} and {High, Low}. At the wealth level W1 the household is
indifferent between either choice, so W1 can be obtained by solving:
v(Low,Low;W1) = v(High, Low;W1) (44)
Similarly, W2 can be obtained by solving
v(High, Low;W2) = v(High,High;W2) (45)
A.2 Pure Public Insurance
A.2.1 Low quality margin
1. When the government announces {T1, h, qi} = {0, 2θlipi, θlipi}, individ-
uals will choose {L2, L3} = {Low,Low} if
u1(W − 2θlipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, Low) + p3u2(s3, Low) ≤ (46)
u1(W − 2θlipi − lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, Low) (47)
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Solving for W , we obtain the condition that W ≤ W PPI1
2. When the government announces {T1, h, q2, q3} = {θlipi, θlipi, 0, θlipi},
individuals will prefer {L2, L3} = {High, Low} to {Low,Low} if
u1(W − (1 + θ)lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, Low) ≥(48)
u1(W − θlipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, Low) + p3u2(s3, Low)(49)
Which is equivalent to the condition that W ≥ W PPI1 .
A.2.2 High quality margin
1. When the government announces {T1, h, qi2, q3} = {θlipi, θlipi, 0, θlipi},
individuals will prefer {L2, L3} = {High, Low} over {High,High} if
u1(W − (1 + θ)lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, Low) ≤(50)
u1(W − θlipi − 2lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, High)(51)
Solving for W , we obtain the condition that W ≤ W PPI2
2. When the government announces {T1, h, q2, q3} = {2θlipi, 0, 0, 0}, indi-
viduals will prefer {L2, L3} = {High,High} to {High, Low} if
u1(W − 2lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, High) ≥ (52)
u1(W − lipi) + p1u2(s1) + p2u2(s2, High) + p3u2(s3, Low) (53)
Which is equivalent to the condition that W ≥ W PPI2 .
A.3 Mandated Insurance
A.3.1 Low quality margin
1. If the government mandates hg = 2θlipi individuals will choose {q2, q3} =
{θl2, θl3} over {l2, θl3} whenever wealth satisfies W < max{W,WMI1 }.
See the discussion in the text.
2. On the right side of the margin, the government can induce individuals
to prefer {q2, q3} = {l2, θl3} over {θl2, θl3} by mandating hg = (1 +
θ)lipi: such insurance level is sufficient to purchase cover {q2, q3} =
{l2, θl3}, and {l2, θl3} is preferred to {θl2, θl3}.
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A.3.2 High quality margin
By setting hg = (1 + θ)lipi for W ≤ W2 and hg = 2lipi for W > W2 the
government can induce optimal choices. To see this, note that individuals
with wealth W2 are indifferent between the two bundles.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
Agent is
endowed with
W
Govt.
chooses
{τ, T1, health plan}
Agent
chooses
{h, qi}
Nature
chooses
state
Agent
chooses
{c, Li, T i2}
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Figure 2: Consumption and health care quality under the three arrangements
{L,L} {H,L} {H,H}
1
2
3
4
5
health care quality
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
MI
PIPC
PPI
Parameters :
Net wealth (W − hg) 5
Mandated/public insurance (hg) 2
Cost of Low quality 1
Cost of High quality 2
26
Table 1: Distortions in health care use: Commitment (C) vs. Pure Public
Insurance (PPI)
[W0,W1) [W1,W
PPI
1 ) [W
PPI
1 ,W2) [W2,W
PPI
2 ) [W
PPI
1 ,+∞)
s2 C Low High High High High
PPI Low Low High High High
-
s3 C Low Low Low High High
PPI Low Low Low Low High
-
Note : (+)indicates overconsumption/overinsurance
(−)indicates underconsumption/underinsurance
Table 2: Distortions in health care use: Commitment vs. Mandated Insur-
ance (MI)
[W0,W
MI
1 ) [W
MI
1 ,W1) [W1,W2) [W2,+∞)
s2 C Low Low High High
MI Low High High High
+
s3 C Low Low Low High
MI Low Low Low High
Note : (+)indicates overconsumption/overinsurance
(−)indicates underconsumption/underinsurance
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